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INTRODUCTION
As communication increasingly shifts to digital platforms,
information derived from online open sources is starting to become
critical in creating an evidentiary basis for international crimes. While
journalists have led the development of many newly emerging open
source investigation methodologies, courts have heightened the
requirements for verifying and preserving a chain of custody—
information linking all of the individuals who possessed the content and
indicating the duration of their custody—creating a need for standards
that are just now beginning to be identified, articulated, and accepted by
the international legal community. In this article, we discuss the impact
of internet-based open source investigations on international criminal
legal processes, as well as challenges related to their use. We also offer
best practices for lawyers, activists, and other individuals seeking to
admit open source information—including content derived from social
media—into courts.

I. BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS OF ONLINE OPEN SOURCE
INFORMATION
A. Legal Uses of OSI in Evidence-Gathering
The use of online open source information2 has a long history in
intelligence gathering. Historically, online open source information was
leveraged by intelligence agents and journalists to gather information on
foreign actors. The Crimean War (1853–1856) was the first major
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conflict to be heavily documented by journalists through visual imagery
and the written word, which in many ways engendered the modern
military-media relationship.3 For those who wanted to understand what
was happening to whom and when, all they had to do was open a
newspaper—a form of open source content. During World War II,
President Roosevelt allotted emergency funds to monitor foreign
broadcasts for intelligence purposes, ultimately leading to the creation of
the Central Intelligence Agency. By the Cold War, television, phone
lines, and radios were being exploited by both sides as a means for
gathering open source intelligence.4
Criminal investigators typically use open source information for
the following two reasons: (1) to discover new information relevant to
their cases and (2) to verify and authenticate existing information
(including witness testimony), mostly through the analysis of videos and
photographs obtained via public, quasi-public, or private sources.5
Discovery and verification can fulfill several needs related to producing
reliable information helpful to legal process.6
First, regarding online discovery, open source methods can be
especially helpful for generating lead, linkage and contextual
information. Lead information is information that “leads” investigators to
potential evidence, such as witnesses or documents.7 For example,
perpetrators who boast about their exploits on Facebook or Twitter might
be geolocated based on identifying markers in the background of
pictures, generating critical information about where they’re located or
where crucial events took place.8 Open source information can also
provide linkage evidence, enabling courts to effectively connect highlevel perpetrators who may have ordered, condoned or failed to punish
criminal activity to on the ground implementers. For example, open
3
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sources, including social media platforms, can be used to help establish
networks surrounding the accused, or to document relevant
communications among disparate actors.9 Video footage posted to social
media can especially be helpful in establishing not just the actus reas—
the physical act of the crime—but also the mens rea—the often hard-toprove intent behind that act. For instance, the intent of the accused might
be made clear through posts on social media that brag about the desire to
kill all of the individuals who comprise a particular religious or ethnic
group (possible genocide), or describe a systematic strategy for seeking
revenge on a person or class of people (possible crime against humanity).
Open source information can also be used to provide contextual
information, offering insights into the who, when, or where of an
incident, and/or providing information that corroborates witness
testimony.10 Given the plethora of problems with overreliance on witness
testimony such as bribery, deception, or memory loss,11 the move
towards gathering and using digital data as a means to corroborate such
testimony is promising.
Second, open source information can help with the verification
of existing information, including data collected through online open
sources, traditional legal investigations, and from activists on the ground.
For example, source materials may include videos and photographs sent
to human rights organizations or court investigators whose alleged
content requires validation. Such verification and authentication are
critical for non-governmental organizations and courts, as both must
establish the credibility of the information they use.12
Citizens outside of conflict zones increasingly play a prominent
role in both the discovery and verification process.13 For example,
9
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(2018); Rebecca J. Hamilton, User-Generated Evidence, 57 COLUM. J.
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Bellingcat, an investigative network run by citizen journalists, has
conducted open source investigations to establish responsibility for the
downing of MH17 over Ukraine, as well as potential crimes committed
during the Syria conflict.14 Other groups, such as the University of
California, Berkeley’s Human Rights Investigations Lab and the
University of Essex’s Human Rights Centre,15 rely on students to
conduct the labor-intensive work of gathering and verifying information
from public sources for advocacy and legal accountability purposes.
Whether obtained online, directly from the source, or through an
intermediary, students can verify and therefore help legitimize (or
discredit) activist videos.16
Unfortunately, however, even when verified, photographs and
videos may not be particularly helpful for courts if what the
photographer or videographer captured provides little contextual, lead, or
linkage information. As a result, the human rights organization,
WITNESS, created the “Video as Evidence Field Guide,” which offers
useful guidance for first responders, activists, survivors, and others who
hope to document violations via video in ways that maximize those
videos’ utility for courts.17 Similarly, the International Bar Association
launched a mobile application called “eyeWitness to Atrocities” to
document violations and preserve that information for court purposes.18
The application collects the date and location of recorded footage from
three different sources and creates a digital fingerprint to prevent that

14

Syrian Archive, Medical Facilities Under Fire: Systematic Attacks During
April 2017 on Idlib Hospitals, BELLINGCAT (July 28, 2017),
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2017/07/28/medical-facilities-firesystematic-attacks-april-2017-idlib-hospitals-serving-one-million-syria/.
15
Amnesty International’s Digital Verification Corps is a consortium of
university students trained in open source verification and discovery who
provide critical capacity for Amnesty researchers. The program launched in Fall
2016 and by Fall 2017 consisted of participants from five universities, including
the University of California, Berkeley, the University of Essex, the University of
Pretoria, the University of Cambridge, and the University of Toronto, with
additional universities slated to join in 2017-2018.
16
Rutkin, supra note 8.
17
Video as Evidence Field Guide, WITNESS, https://vae.witness.org/video-asevidence-field-guide/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2019).
18
Collect Verifiable Photos and Videos, FAQs, EYEWITNESS,
http://www.eyewitnessproject.org/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2017); see also Hamilton,
supra note 12, at 17–18.
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information from being edited. The software also establishes and
preserves a chain of custody.19

B. Benefits
Though open source information has been systematically mined
from the Internet by human rights advocates and international criminal
investigators for a relatively short time, its potential contribution to the
field is apparent. Examples of this contribution include providing
“access” to conflict zones that cannot be physically accessed for security,
diplomatic, or logistical reasons, engaging civilians on the ground, and
enabling stronger investigations by generating information that
corroborates or discredits witness testimony and other evidence.
Recently, open source information has provided a means to
access information in remote conflict zones in Libya,20 Syria,21
Cameroon,22 and Myanmar.23 This includes not only photographs and
videos as mentioned above, but also data derived from crowdsourcing
tools such as Wikimapia or satellite imagery provided through online
platforms such as Google Earth. Satellite imagery is increasingly
available through public platforms at no or low cost and may also be
available through closed or open sources. It can help establish the
location of an atrocity and show changes to a particular location over
time (such as before and after visuals of a hospital bombing).24 This

19

See Hamilton, supra note 12, at 18 (explaining how material is automatically
encrypted before being stored in a “secure evidence locker” and catalogued by a
team of attorneys).
20
How a Werfalli Execution Site Was Geolocated, BELLINGCAT (Oct. 3, 2017),
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2017/10/03/how-an-execution-site-wasgeolocated/.
21
See, e.g., ANNA BANCHIK ET AL., CHEMICAL STRIKES ON AL LATAMINAH
(Human Rights Center, UC Berkeley School of Law, 2018), available at
https://humanrights.berkeley.edu/publications/chemical-strikes-al-lataminah.
22
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Investigations,
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(Sept.
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Atrocity:
Finding The Soldiers Who Killed This Woman, BBC NEWS (Sept. 24, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-africa-45599973/cameroon-atrocityfinding-the-soldiers-who-killed-this-woman.
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Steven Stecklow, Why Facebook is Losing the War on Hate Speech in
Myanmar, REUTERS (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/
special-report/myanmar-facebook-hate/.
24
See AAAS Sci. Responsibility, Human Rights & Law Program, Conflict in
Aleppo, Syria: A Retrospective Analysis, AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
SCI., https://www.aaas.org/aleppo_retrospective (last visited Aug. 3, 2018)
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temporal mapping can assist in the development of an event chronology
(for example, showing the before and after of razed villages), or can be
used to help predict future events and plan for interventions.25
One organization that has effectively used open source
information is the Syrian Archive, an organization dedicated to
preserving evidence of human rights violations committed by all sides of
the conflict in Syria.26 The Archive has gathered more than 1,400,000
videos, some of which have been verified and appear to depict chemical
weapons attacks that violate international law.27 This is invaluable
documentation given the increasingly hostile propaganda efforts of some
of the world’s most powerful political players.28 The Archive leverages
both Syrian-based human rights advocates as well as remote media
activists, journalists, and lawyers to document, preserve, and verify
information related to the conflict, underscoring the incredible potential
impact of coordinated civilian efforts.29

C. Limitations
Despite its many strengths, open source information is also
subject to serious limitations. For example, the engagement of everyday
citizens in documenting atrocities through video and photography may
prove to be a double-edged sword. Video evidence can expose potential
witnesses and the videographer, endangering their families and
communities.30 Thus, taking steps to ensure adequate protection of
individuals is critical, and the potential risks involved in storing or
releasing images or video content must be carefully calibrated.31
Mitigating the risk of endangering witnesses and civilian investigators
(discussing the efforts of Amnesty International, USA to use satellite images to
document more than one hundred instances of damage to buildings).
25
Steven Livingston, Satellite Imagery Augments Power and Responsibility of
Human Rights Groups, BROOKINGS (June 23, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu
/blog/techtank/2016/06/23/satellite-imagery-augments-power-andresponsibility-of-human-rights-groups/.
26
About, SYRIAN ARCHIVE, https://syrianarchive.org/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2019).
27
Id.
28
Id.
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See id.
30
Ethical Guidelines for Using Videos in Human Rights Reporting, WITNESS,
https://witness.org/portfolio_page/ethical-guidelines-for-using-videos-in-humanrights-reporting-and-advocacy/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2017).
31
See THE ENGINE ROOM, DATNAV: HOW TO NAVIGATE DIGITAL DATA FOR
HUMAN
RIGHTS
RESEARCH
34
(2017),
available
at
https://www.theengineroom.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/en-datnavreport_high-quality_web_.pdf (discussing the importance of content verification
and the “Do-No-Harm” principle).
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remains one of the most challenging aspects of this work. Further, when
users choose to remain anonymous, the process by which to admit such
user-generated evidence may be ambiguous as judges wrestle with
assigning probative value to the information.32
In addition, the likelihood of acquiring and potentially using
misinformation found online is relatively high, so verification of that
content is crucial. Some of the most common pitfalls of open source
information include misattribution, staging, and technical manipulation.33
Misattribution occurs frequently and involves deliberately or
inadvertently recycling online content with the wrong date, time, or
location.34 Staging transpires when one party attempts to frame another
by “staging” and filming an event that never occurred, or edits a video to
mislead viewers about what actually took place. Technical manipulation
involves manipulating photos and videos with Photoshop or other photo
editing tools (e.g., swapping out military insignia).35 Further, generative
adversarial networks are increasingly being used to generate “deep
fakes,” artificially-generated videos that suggest someone said or did
something that never occurred in real life.36 Given the vast number of
ways digital content can be altered, information derived from open
sources must be handled carefully, especially if used to demonstrate the
“truth” of what took place. “Ground truthing”—having those on the
ground in a conflict zone confirm the accuracy of open source analysis—
and engaging in verification processes that focus on both source and
content analysis remain critical components of ensuring the validity of
open source content.

32

See Hamilton, supra note 12, at 49–50.
THE ENGINE ROOM, supra note 30, at 35.
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See, e.g., Eliot Higgins, Misattribution, Verification, ISIS, and Madaya,
BELLINGCAT (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/casestudies/2016/01/11/misattribution-verification-isis-and-madaya/;
see
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FOUNDATION (Dec. 15–17, 2017), available at https://firstdraftnews.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/The-Disinformation-Ecosystem-20180207-v4.pdf.
35
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(forthcoming 2019).
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D. The Need for Open Source Information: Shortcomings of
Witness Testimony
Despite the many challenges found in validating digital
evidence, weaknesses inherent to witness testimony make the move
toward incorporating other forms of information vital. Triangulation of
physical, documentary, and testimonial evidence remains the gold
standard; as a form of documentary evidence, open source information
can be helpful for corroborating witness testimony and developing the
strongest possible narrative in court.
In recent years, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has
recognized the need to diversify its evidence due to witness tampering
and other witness-related challenges, specifically noting witness
intimidation and protection as key challenges in its 2012–2015 Strategic
Plan.37 Later, in its 2016–2018 Strategic Plan, the Office of the
Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC found that witness interference—the act of
altering or attempting to alter the content of a witness’s testimony, or
helping to prevent a witness from testifying—may have occurred in eight
of the first nine cases at the ICC.38 The OTP states that “almost all cases
in the confirmation of charges and trial phases have been or are
confronted with incidents of obstruction of justice—in particular witness
tampering.”39 Witness interference is thus a serious threat to the Court’s
legitimacy and effective functioning. In the 2012 Lubanga case, the
chamber concluded that nine out of the thirty-six witnesses were not
credible after it was found that prosecution intermediaries may have
coached their witnesses, child soldiers, to lie about their identities and
experiences.40 In the 2016 Bemba case, five defendants, including JeanPierre Bemba himself, were convicted of coercing fourteen witnesses
into providing false testimony.41 Such distortions undermine the rule of
law and can lead to wrongful convictions or acquittals. Furthermore, the
failure to protect witnesses testifying at the ICC can have grave
consequences for the safety and well-being of witnesses, their families,
and communities.

37

INT’L BAR ASS’N, EVIDENCE MATTERS IN ICC TRIALS 21 (2016).
OPEN SOC. JUSTICE INITIATIVE, WITNESS INTERFERENCE IN CASES BEFORE
THE
INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL
COURT
2–3
(Nov.
2016),
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/factsheet-icc-witnessinterference-20161116.pdf [hereinafter Briefing Paper].
39
INT’L CRIMINAL COURT: OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, STRATEGIC PLAN
2016–2018 13 (2015), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/enotp_strategic_plan_2016-2018.pdf.
40
See Briefing Paper, supra note 37, at 4–5.
41
Id. at 4.
38
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In addition, memories can be fallible under the best of
circumstances; time and trauma can further exacerbate challenges with
input, storage, and recall. Substantial literature exists on the fallacies of
human memory and the tendency to erroneously recollect events.42 In the
2016 ICC case, Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, forensic psychologist Dr. John
Charles Yuille provided his expert opinion on methods of recall:
“[H]uman memory is reconstructive . . . . We don't play a tape back.
We recreate a memory at the time of recall. And when we recreate
the memory, there are two different forms that the memory can take.
One form is where the person . . . remember[s] the event as they
originally . . . perceived it. So they're looking through their eyes and
recalling the event as it unfolded in front of them. There is a second
kind of recall in which a person will recall an event but see
themselves in it, that is they don't perceive it as they originally did.
It's as if they were at a different place in the room and watching it
unfold and they actually see themselves in the event.”43

The malleability of memory was similarly underscored in a 1998 study
by Elizabeth Loftus, a leading cognitive psychologist who illustrated the
ability of a third party to introduce false facts and alter how subjects
remembered various events.44 This phenomenon was later dubbed the
“misinformation effect.”45
External interference is just one form of memory distortion;
memories can be distorted even at their inception.46 In addition, bias can
distort recall. Further, while confidence and accuracy tend to correlate,
witness confidence levels are often higher for incorrect information than
correct information when misleading information is injected into
conversations.47 Thus, the malleability of the human mind, coupled with
the potential of witness intimidation and suggestion by third parties, as
well as cognitive biases, necessitates corroborating information.
In cases facing dismissal due to evidentiary deficiencies, open
source information may prove pivotal to preventing a case from being
dismissed due to insufficient evidence. Most recently, evidentiary
deficiencies proved determinative in the cases of Gbagbo and Blé Goude
at the International Criminal Court in January 2019. The two defendants
had been charged with crimes against humanity—including murder and
42

See generally Engelhardt, supra note 11.
Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06), Trial Hearing, p. 27, ¶¶2–
11 (Apr. 18, 2016).
44
Engelhardt, supra note 11, at 26.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 27.
47
Id. at 28.
43
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rape—allegedly committed in Cote d’Ivoire in 2010 and 2011 during the
aftermath of the country’s 2010 presidential election.48 In the acquittal,
the Court noted that prosecutors had failed to provide sufficient evidence
to suggest their culpability.49 Indeed, evidence can be particularly
difficult to obtain in the aftermath of conflict. Witnesses may fear
retribution and refrain from coming forward, and supporting
documentation may have been destroyed, be inaccessible, or be
otherwise nonexistent.50 Investigators may also simply fail to gather all
available information from both offline and online sources.
Today, citizens and journalists are increasingly documenting
human rights violations from the frontlines and sharing that information
online.51 Once such documentation undergoes an extensive verification
process by an established expert or expert community, such online
information can be helpful for strengthening cases and should be
admissible in court, especially if witnesses can testify to its veracity

II. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LAWYERS SEEKING TO INCORPORATE
OPEN SOURCE EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS
As noted above, online open source investigative methods
relevant to international criminal investigations have largely been
pioneered by investigative journalists, the intelligence community, and
human rights activists. However, international investigators and
prosecutors are increasingly recognizing that the protocol for
determining what online content is potentially relevant, how information
is captured and preserved, and how such information is presented in
court can radically differ when used for legal as opposed to intelligence
or advocacy purposes.52 Thus, there is a significant need for standards
that bring consistency to the field so that (1) international investigators
can manage online content to maximize its potential value, and (2)
48

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, SITUATION IN COTE D’IVOIRE:
PROSECUTOR V. LAURENT GBAGBO AND CHARLES BLÉ GOUDÉ (2019), available
at https://www.icc-cpi.int/CaseInformationSheets/gbagbo-goudeEng.pdf.
49
See, e.g., Oumar Ba, The International Criminal Court just acquitted the
former Ivory Coast president. What happens now?, WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 22,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2019/01/22/the-international-criminal-court-just-acquitted-the-formerivory-coast-president-what-happens-now/?utm_term=.774e53a0a9b3.
50
UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY SCH. OF LAW: HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., DIGITAL
FINGERPRINTS: USING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE TO ADVANCE PROSECUTIONS AT
THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 3 (2014), available at
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/HRC/Digital_fingerprints_interior_cover2.p
df.
51
See Hamilton, supra note 12, at 3–4.
52
Alexa Koenig et al., supra note 3, at 694.
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judges and other decision-makers know how to evaluate the reliability of
that information and assign it appropriate weight.53
Ideally, such standards would operate at a high level, addressing
the big picture of how an investigation should be conducted, how digital
information should be stored, how to preserve a digital chain of custody,
and how to think about the legal and ethical responsibilities that court
actors may have to those who forward information for court purposes or
to those who are otherwise connected to that information. The standards
should not get into the details of which software to use or the exact
methods of analysis because the various tools and methods change
quickly. Doing so would potentially render the standards obsolete.
Instead, the focus should be on basic principles of data collection,
storage, analysis, and presentation.
In October 2017, eighteen experts from around the world—
including international prosecutors, digital forensics experts, open source
investigators, academics, diplomats and activists—gathered in Bellagio,
Italy to discuss the growing practice of conducting open source
investigations for international accountability purposes, and to begin a
dialogue around the development of legal standards, including a possible
protocol.54 Participants included representatives from the ICC, the
Commission for International Justice and Accountability, the Geneva
Academy, the Association for the Study of War Crimes, WITNESS,
Amnesty International, and the Syrian Archive.55 Consensus was reached
on several key issues. For instance, the parties agreed upon definitions
relevant to open source investigations conducted for international legal
purposes and several recommended outputs for helping to advance this
field of practice, including an international protocol designed to increase
the quality and consistency of the use of open source methods for
evidence collection and verification.56 As a result, the Human Rights
Center at the University of California, Berkeley began drafting an
international protocol with support from a wide circle of advisors, with a
probable release date by 2020. The protocol will be translated into
multiple languages for the broadest possible application. The audience
will include first responders, NGOs, court actors, national war crimes
teams, activists, and others who are not operating under a specific
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP).

53

THE NEW FORENSICS USING OPEN SOURCE INFORMATION TO INVESTIGATE
GRAVE CRIMES, supra note 5, 15–17, 19.
54
Id. at 13.
55
Id. at 14.
56
Id.
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The experts also agreed upon the need to develop a community
of practitioners that can peer review online open source investigations,
including the potential development of an ongoing roster of experts.57 At
a minimum, this community will attempt to advance relevant methods,
encourage ethical practice, and identify individuals with specific
methodological expertise.58
In addition to reaching consensus on key definitions, the group
agreed on principles that should—at a minimum—underlie the protocol.
These include the need for59:
1. preservation (to ensure that information that is
uploaded to the internet is not lost to history if, for
example, it is removed by platforms for violating
terms of service agreements or community
guidelines, or for other purposes);
2. legality (to ensure that investigations do not fall
afoul of human rights norms, privacy considerations,
or the law);
3. transparency of methods (any expert in open source
investigations should be able to understand the
methods that were used and explain them to a court;
ideally, peer investigators should be able to replicate
the investigation process and reach similar
conclusions);
4. security (a mitigation of harm provision that should
take into consideration the physical, digital, and
psycho-social well-being of the investigator, the
investigated, the person who created and/or posted
the item to the internet, and anyone featured within
that item); and
5. objectivity (when conducted by legal investigators,
the investigation should not favor either side, but
instead should focus on both incriminating and
exonerating information).
An overarching consideration is ethics, which may manifest in
different ways across these five principles. Moreover, creative thinking
and mastering diverse verification techniques can heighten the reliability
of the evidence. On the discovery side, it is important to assess how
57

Id. at 13.
Id.
59
Id. at 8–11.
58
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people in a given community communicate and turn to those sources for
potential information; for example, turning to Twitter makes little sense
if no one in that community uses it. It is equally important to assess the
terms used by that community (including slang, which can be used to
locate relevant online conversations), the sometimes-diverse spellings of
key names, and variations in the location, gender, and age of users.
Any open source information used in court proceedings should
be carefully verified. As mentioned earlier, verification should include a
minimum of two steps: (1) verification of the source and (2) verification
of the content. Primary objectives should include validating the source or
the initial creator and the individual who uploaded or shared the content,
the location and time the content was created, and the “reason” the
content exists. Answering the who, what, where, when, why, and how
underlying digital data helps maximize that information’s potential use
by prosecutors by helping place that information in context, and helps
judges award information appropriate weight when entered into
evidence.
A wide variety of information can be used to help verify the
content of photographs and videos. Such information includes: (1) the
identification of any metadata; (2) geolocation of any images (for
example, using satellite imagery to identify the probable location of
distinctive background markers, such as notable buildings or other
surroundings); (3) chronolocation, like using sun calculation tools to
corroborate probable time of day, or using weather records to help
confirm the purported date or location; (4) background research into the
uploader and/or original documenter to determine if it is likely that she
was actually where she would have needed to be to capture the
information (for example, scanning social media to see if the documenter
regularly posts information from or about that country or apparently
visited the country around that time); and (5) the use of newspaper
articles and NGO reports to check external consistency and provide
context.

A. Gathering Metadata
While the admissibility of digital evidence varies across
jurisdictions, certain practices maximize the potential for acceptance.
Metadata may help establish the time and date the file was created, any
associated account, information about the device the file was created on,
and any edits made to the file.60 Ideally, metadata is available to help
verify and authenticate potential evidence. Electronic documents, such as
word documents, often contain metadata that may aid in the verification
60

See The Engine Room, supra note 30, at 36.

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

142

of the content.61 The data is automatically produced by the software or
may be supplied by the item’s creator.62 Since metadata is typically
generated automatically, often without the knowledge or aid of the user,
it is less likely to be manipulated or deleted than other content.63 In the
case of video footage, investigators may be able to use metadata to
determine the location of the place featured in the video and the creator
of the video, which can then be extrapolated out to investigate featured
events.
The interpretation of metadata, however, requires a set of
fundamental assumptions. For instance, one must assume that the time
zone on the device correctly reflects its surrounding environment at the
time of the information’s creation and that no one overrode or
contaminated the metadata.64 Thus, corroboration of metadata is often
necessary.

B. Establishing Chain of Custody
Chain of custody65 is a fundamental and critical issue for
physical and offline documentary evidence, yet it is often overlooked by
activists when securing potential evidence from open sources. The
preservation of chain of custody can enhance transparency around how
the investigator acquired the information and help ensure a lack of
tampering with any collected information.66
Two of the biggest concerns with digital evidence are the risk of
manipulation and the risk of take down, especially regarding graphic or
controversial imagery. Archiving any photograph or video found online
helps ensure that material will still be accessible for court purposes, even
years in the future. It also ensures that legal actors can reference the
video, photograph, post, or other content without solely relying on
screenshots, which—like any digital image—can be manipulated. Tools
such as Meedan’s Keep,67 Enrique Piracés’ Video Vault,68 and the

61

STEPHEN MASON & DANIEL SENG, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE 27 (4th ed., Inst. of
Advanced Legal Stud., Sch. of Advanced Study, Univ. of London 2017).
62
Id.
63
Manipulation is still possible and several social media platforms automatically
strip content of related metadata. Id.
64
Id. at 28.
65
Preserving chain of custody consists of documenting who had access to a unit
of evidence and when, as an accountability mechanism to protect against anyone
tampering with that evidence. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
66
See The Engine Room, supra note 30, at 36.
67
MEEDAN, https://meedan.com/en/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
68
VIDEO VAULT, https://www.bravenewtech.org/ (last visited March 22, 2019).
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Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine69 can be used to safely store digital
files in a virtual space to mitigate the risk of an uploader or an adversary
deleting the original. Tools like Hunch.ly70 take chain of custody to the
next level so that the path can later be forensically analyzed by not only
making it possible to access the acquired information, but also creating a
record of how the digital search was conducted. Increasingly, legal
investigators are “hashing”71 content so that they can later confirm the
integrity of the evidence by checking that it hasn’t been modified since
the original capture.72
However, investigators rarely start the chain of custody.
Frequently, electronic evidence, especially in the form of video, is shared
via private networks. This makes it impossible for investigators to verify
the original time of the content’s creation and the initial individuals
through whom the content passed. The mere act of examining digital
data—reading or opening an electronic file—risks contamination.
Furthermore, videos shot by non-professionals are often of relatively
poor quality, making verification more difficult. While technology
companies, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, do store metadata
affiliated with videos and photographs internally, they are reluctant to
release that information for international criminal justice purposes
without going through a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) or other
formal court process, in part to avoid endangering users or infringing on
user privacy. The higher standard for open source materials to be used
for trial, versus the standard for journalistic and/or human rights
advocacy purposes, makes documenting all discovery, verification and
preservation practices a necessity. Ensuring evidence is admitted and
accorded significant weight by judges may largely depend on the amount
of metadata collected, the preservation of chain of custody, and the
quality of verification and authentication.

69

INTERNET ARCHIVE’S WAYBACK MACHINE, https://archive.org/web/ (last
visited Feb. 16, 2019).
70
HUNCH.LY, http://hunch.ly (last visited Feb. 16, 2019).
71
Hashing is using a mathematical function to generate a value or values that
can be used to protect the security of a digital item from tampering. Comparing
a digital unit’s hash values at different time points can establish whether that
unit has been modified in the intervening time period. (If the numbers match, the
unit hasn’t changed.) Hash Functions, NAT’L INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS &
TECH. (Jan. 31, 2018), https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/hash-functions/sha-3project.
72
See, e.g., Jeff Deutch & Hadi Habal, The Syrian Archive: A Methodological
Case Study of Open-Source Investigation of State Crime Using Video Evidence
from Social Media Platforms, 7 STATE CRIME J. 46, 58 (2018) (discussing the
hashing of videos derived from open source content).
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There are both internal and external markers of reliability that
increase the likelihood that digital data can be authenticated. The
following chart specifies metrics for both categories:
Category

Internal Markers

External Markers73

Metadata

Date stamps, timestamps,
digital signatures, GPS data
and triangulation,
watermarking

Source

Location

Street signs, prominent
landmarks

Storage/ Chain of
Custody

Integrity

Whether tampered with, via
editing or manipulation
Capturing event in its entirety,
people arriving/leaving,
surroundings

Testimony

Hash values that serve as a
unique identifier and can be
assigned to a single file or
group of files.

Consent of use in legal
proceeding

Continuity

Identity

Replicable process for
gathering and storing the
evidence

Taking into consideration these internal and external markers can
help investigators and prosecutors maximize the legal value of the
information they collect and help judges and other fact finders assess
both its veracity and its reliability.

CONCLUSION
As mentioned above, guidelines, including an international
protocol, are currently being developed to clarify the basic practices and
minimum standards that should be employed when conducting online
open source investigations and verifying that content for courts. Such
guidelines will help international criminal investigators obtain
appropriate information for prosecution and provide support for how
information should properly be acquired, preserved, and presented.
While the amount of digital data accessible to legal investigators will
continue to grow exponentially, digital evidence must be properly stored,
73

New Perimeter: Our Global Bono Initiative, Using Photos and Videos as
Evidence, DLA PIPER 13–14 (June 18, 2012) (on file with authors).
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catalogued, and mined in order to avoid a digital backlog.74 Ultimately,
international criminal investigators should adhere to forthcoming
standards to ensure that the paramount images—those images that
frontline activists and survivors may risk their lives to acquire—can
realize their full potential in court.

74

See Lindsay Freeman, Digital Evidence and War Crimes Prosecutions: The
Impact of Digital Technologies on International Criminal Investigations and
Trials, 41 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 283, 333–35 (2018) (discussing the importance
of lawyers using new technologies to manage digital evidence.

